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We propose a non-deterministic two-way quantum key distribution in which the quantum cor-
relation is established by transmitting the randomly polarized photon. We analyze the security of
the proposed quantum key distribution against photon number splitting, impersonation, and Trojan
horse attack and quantify the security bound against mean photon number of the coherent state
pulse. Finally, we remark the characteristic features of the protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3] is to gen-
erate shared secret information between distant parties
with negligible leakage of the information to an eaves-
dropper Eve. The security of QKD is based on the no-
cloning theorem: Eve can not extract any information
without introducing errors [3], while the security of the
classical key distribution or cryptography is supported
by the computational complexity of the underling math-
ematical problems [4]. Since the QKD by Bennent and
Brassard (BB84) [1], there has been security proof [5]
and theoretical proposals to enhance the security [6].
The Ping-Pong protocol (PP) proposed by Bostro¨m
et al. [7] is the first two-way quantum key distribu-
tion based on entangled qubit. It is a conceptually new
scheme in the sense that the key is generated by the round
trip of the qubit, while in the conventional QKD it is done
with single trip. With this trend, Lucamarini et al. [8]
proposed the two-way protocol without entanglement by
merging the peculiarities of BB84 and PP and recently,
Kye et. al., proposed to the three-way QKD [9] to make
the encoding possible with relatively dense coherent-state
pulse. One of the interesting aspects of their protocol is
to use the qubit with random polarization, while in the
conventional protocol, predefined finite number of polar-
ization states is used [1, 2, 3, 7, 8].
In the multi-way quantum key distribution [7, 8, 9],
the fact that the final key is led by only one party which
allows creating the key in deterministic way is consid-
ered as an advantage for the direct encoding. However
in some cases the deterministic feature of QKD without
dissipation of the qubit often provides Eve with the room
to track the protocol easily [15, 16]. That is to say the
deterministic feature can play a role of potential security
hole in QKD.
In this paper, we propose a non-deterministic two-way
QKD in which the quantum correlation is established by
transmitting the randomly polarized photon. The initial
random polarization |θ〉 with arbitrary θ ∈ [0, π] is com-
pensated by acting the unitary operator U(−θ) on the
returning qubit and the net encoding information can be
extracted from that. In addition, the non-deterministic
feature comes from the N number of screening angle
which is chosen by Alice at the initial stage of the proto-
col. The key is created only when the matching condition
of the corresponding screening angles is satisfied and it
plays important role in blocking up the impersonation
and Trojan horse attack.
QKD using coherent-state pulse has received much
attentions in regard to the practical implementation
[3, 9, 11]. Since there is no phase reference outside
Alice or Bob’s lab, a coherent-state |√µeiθ〉 of mean
photon number µ is effectively described by photon
number eigenstate |n〉 with Poission distribution:
|√µ〉 = exp(−µ/2)√µn/
√
n!|n〉 [12]. As we shall see, our
proposal has remarkable advantages for implementation
using coherent-state pulse, because the protocol allows
not only to transmit the relative dense coherent pulse
but also to increase the raw key creation rate. Our
protocol is described as follows:
Protocol:
(P.1) Alice and Bob initiate the protocol by announcing a
set S(N) which has N number of screening angles,
S(N) = {α1, · · ·αN}, (1)
where N ≥ 2 and the screening angle αi is defined
as αi = iπ/(N + 1).
(P.2) Alice take arbitrary angle θ and chooses screening
angle αa and random screening factor s ∈ {0, 1}.
She prepares the qubit:
|θ + δ0sαa〉, (2)
where δpq = 1 for p = q otherwise δpq = 0. Al-
ice occasionally takes θ with the probability c as
a predefined value θ∗ ∈ {0, π/2} which is called
authentication angle. If θ = θ∗ then the proto-
col follows the authentication mode (A-Mode) else
transmission mode (T-Mode).
(A-mode 1) Bob chooses a screening angle αb. He acts
U((−1)kπ/4+αb) on the received qubit, where
k is key bit. The qubit becomes
|θ∗ + (−1)kπ/4 + δ0sαa + αb〉, (3)
2The fraction (1−t) of the photons in the qubit
enter into the Bob’s detector, where t is the
transmission efficiency of Bob’s detector. Bob
records the outcome Ob in his detector.
(A-mode 2) After acting U(−θ∗ + δ1sαa) on the returning
qubit, Alice has the qubit |(−1)kπ/4+αb+αb〉.
She measures the qubit and the outcome is
recorded as Oa.
(A-mode 3) Alice declares the mode is A-mode, then Alice
and Bob announce the chosen screening angles
αa and αb, respectively. If the screening angles
satisfy that
αa + αb = π, (4)
then the qubit incoming to Bob’s detector is
|θ∗ + (−1)kπ/4〉. So the corresponding out-
come Ob and encoded key k are correlated by
Ob = k ⊕ (2θ∗/π), (5)
where ⊕ is the addition on mod 2 space. If
the verification is failed, Alice and Bob imme-
diately terminate the protocol and initiate the
protocol form (P.1) later. If αa + αb 6= π in
above step Alice and Bob return (P.2).
(T-mode 1) Bob chooses a screening angle αb. He acts
U((−1)kπ/4+αb) on the received qubit, where
k is key bit. The qubit becomes
|θ + (−1)kπ/4 + δ0sαa + αb〉. (6)
Bob returns the qubit to Alice.
(T-mode 2) Alice acts U(−θ + δ1sαa) on the returning
qubit and it becomes |(−1)kπ/4 + αa + αb〉.
Alice measures the qubit and gets the outcome
Oa.
(T-mode 3) Alice and Bob announce the chosen screening
angles αa and αb respectively. If the screening
angles satisfy that αa+αb = π, then Alice gets
the key k for the outcome Oa:
Oa = k, (7)
else Alice and Bob go to (P.2). If the desired
key length is created then go to (P.3)
(P.3) Alice and Bob create key ka and kb by concatenat-
ing key bits and exchange the hash values h(ka) and
h(kb) [9]. If h(ka) = h(kb) then the key creation is
finished else Alice and Bob start again from (P.1).
Eq. (5) shows Alice’s integrity condition observed in
Bob’s detector(D0, D1 in Fig. 1), which plays an im-
portant role to detect lethal strategy like impersonation
FIG. 1: Schematic diagram for the experimental setup. D0
and D1: Bob’s detectors; D3 and D4: Alice’s detectors; PBS:
Polarization Beam Splitter. Bob has equipped the optical
filter to reject undesired frequency.
and Trojan Horse attack. Even though the key encod-
ing is performed by Bob deterministically, the final key
is rearranged whether the matching condition in Eq. (4)
is satisfied or not. In the QKD the raw key creation
rate depends on the number of screening angle and mode
probability as
Rraw = qµfreptlinkηdet, (8)
where q depends on implementation (q = (1 − c)/N for
our protocol), frep is pulse rate, tlink the transmission
and ηdet the detection efficiency [3]. Now, we shall
analyze the security of the protocol.
Security against photon number splitting (PNS) attack:
Since A-mode is only for authenticating purpose, it is
enough to consider that Eve’s attack is focused on the
T-mode in quantifying the PNS attack [10]. As usual,
we assume that Eve is so superior that her action is lim-
ited only by the law of physics. Against the coherent
state |√µ〉 from Alice, she replaces the lossy channel by
a perfect one and puts a beam splitter of transmission
efficiency η in the middle [10]. The reflected field, which
is a coherent state with its amplitude |√1− η√µ〉, will
be the source of information to Eve. In the protocol
(T-mode.1)-(T-mode.3), the information transmitted be-
tween Alice and Bob is of random polarization. In our
protocol, the photon polarizations lie on the equator of
the Poincare´ sphere. Thus, in this case, Eve’s goal is to
find the optimum state estimation from n qubits gives
the maximal mean fidelity given by [17]:
I(n) =
1
2
+
1
2n+1
n−1∑
ℓ=0
√(
n
ℓ
)(
n
ℓ+ 1
)
. (9)
Let us first consider the maximum information Eve can
get from the Alice→ Bob channel in (a.2). The probabil-
ity of there being n photons of the channel in the coherent
3state |
√
(1− η)µ〉 is PAB(n) = exp[−(1 − η)µ] [(1−η)µ]
n
n! .
The received qubit in Bob’s end is |√ηµ〉 and after
transmission of the detector, it becomes |√ηtµ〉. Thus
in Bob → Alice channel, the probability of there be-
ing n photons in the coherent state |√1− η√ηtµ〉 is
PBA(n) = exp[−(1− η)ηtµ] [(1−η)ηtµ]
n
n!
Then the maximum amount of information Eve can
get from the channel in A→B and B→A is IAB =∑
∞
n=0 PAB(n)I(n) and IBA =
∑
∞
n=0 PBA(n)I(n), re-
spectively. The maximum information Eve can obtain
is bounded by IE = min(IAB , IBA), which is plotted in
Fig. 2 for various cases. Since the intensity of the coher-
ent pulse decreases as the number of laps between Alice
and Bob, IE is actually determined by IBA.
Now we define the critical value of initial amplitude
α∗ which gives the average number of photons delivered
to Alice about 1 after (T-mode 3). Since the incom-
ing amplitude of the coherent pulse in (T-mode 3) is
|
√
(1− η)ηtµ〉, the critical value of initial amplitude is
given by µ∗ = 1/((1 − η)ηt). At the critical value of
initial amplitude, maximum bound for Eve’s information
I∗E =
∑
∞
n=0
exp(−1)
n! I(n) ≈ 0.6900, while the mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob is unity (if the detector
of Alice is not clicked in a particular time window due to
the empty pulse, Alice and Bob could exclude the corre-
sponding event by announcing that the pulse is empty).
That is to say, at the critical amplitude Alice and Bob
shares 31% higher information than that of Eve. So Al-
ice and Bob could create the final key through the post
processing like privacy amplification [18].
We remark the critical mean photon number in our pro-
tocol is on 5 ≤ µ∗ ≤ 15 which is at least ten times larger
value than µ ≤ 0.2 [13, 14] of conventional QKD. Accord-
ingly, our protocol allow the higher raw key creation rate,
even though the q factor in Eq. (9) is slightly smaller that
the conventional QKD.
Security against Impersonation attack:
Eve can impersonate Bob to Alice and Bob to Alice in the
quantum channel. This type of attack is effective on the
protocol which transmits the qubit without dissipation of
the qubit [7, 9]. Against our protocol, Eve may consider
the following strategy:
(A1.1) After the step (P2) Eve intercepts the qubit and
puts it in the quantum storage. Let’s call it E1 =
{|θ+ δ0sαa〉}. Eve prepare fake qubit |θ′ + δ0s′α′a〉
and send it to Bob.
(A1.2) After the step (A-mode 1) or (T-mode1), Eve in-
tercepts again the qubit whose state is given by
|(−1)kπ/4 + θ′ + δ0s′α′a + αb〉. Eve gets the qubit
|(−1)kπ/4 + αb〉 after acting U(−θ′ − δ0s′α′a) on
the qubit. Eve measures the qubit with guessing
αb = α
′
b and gets the outcome Oe and key k
′ = Oe.
(A1.3) Eve encodes the intercepted original qubit E1 by
acting U((−1)k′π/4 + α′b). The intercepted qubit
becomes E′1 = {|(−1)k
′
π/4+ θ+ δ0sαa+α
′
b〉}. Eve
sends the qubit to Alice.
If Eve impersonate the quantum channel during T-mode,
the probability that Eve’s guessing of αb in (A1.2) was
right is 1/N . Accordingly Alice’s key with Eve’s imper-
sonation includes the error with the probability and it
should be noticed in the step (P.3).
On the other hand, if Eve impersonates the quantum
channel during A-mode, Eve’s impersonation can be
also detected at the step (A-mode 3). In the step
(A1.1), Eve’s fake qubit |θ′ + α′a〉 is entered into Bob’s
detector with the transmission efficiency (1 − t). In
that case, Eve’s fake qubit violates with the integrity
condition of Eq. (5) because the probability that Eve’s
guessing was matched with Alice’s authentication angle
as well as screening, θ′ = θ∗ and α′a = αa is almost null
(here we use the fact that Eve does not know if the
protocol in A-mode or T-mode). Eve’s impersonation
should be notice in the step (A-mode 3) with Eq. (5)-(6).
Security against Trojan Horse type attack:
Eve could attach ancillary qubit to the transmitted qubit
and after the Bob’s encoding, she reads out the encoding
by measuring the ancillary qubit after separating out the
ancillary qubit form the unified qubit. It is shown that
the attack strategy is effective on the multiple-way proto-
col [7, 15]. We assume that Alice has a properly designed
filter to reject the unnecessary of photons with split wave
length as in Fig. 1 [3]. So Eve has some difficulty to dis-
tinguish ancillary form the full qubit and eventually she
could not separate out the ancillary qubit form the uni-
fied qubit, perfectly. Nevertheless, to demonstrate the
robustness of our protocol, we allow Eve to inject the an-
cillary qubit which has split wave length compared with
the transmitted qubit and to separate the ancillary qubit
from the returning qubit.
Eve may consider the strategy as follows:
(A2.1) After the step (A-mode 1) or (T-mode 1), Eve pre-
pares an ancillary state |0〉 and attaches the ancil-
lary onto the qubit from Alice. The qubit with the
ancillary state is |θ + δ0sαa〉 ⊗ |0〉. Eve sends the
qubit to Bob.
(A2.2) After the step (A-mode 1) or (T-mode 1), the re-
turning qubit becomes |(−1)kπ/4+θ+δ0sαa+αb〉⊗
|(−1)kπ/4 + αb〉. Eve separates out ancillary and
keep the qubit in storage as E2 = {|(−1)kπ/4 +
αb〉}. After the step (A-mode 3) or (T-mode 3),
Eve knows the Bob’s screening angle αb and mea-
sures the qubit in A1 and reads the key k.
If Eve can distinguish if the protocol is in either T-mode
or A-mode. Eve attacks on the protocol only when the
protocol is in T-mode. In that case, she can read the
key in the fraction of t of the created key, because the
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FIG. 2: Maximum bound for Eve’s information IE as a function of mean photon number µ of the coherent-state pulse according
to various channel transmission efficiency η at the transmission efficiency of Bob’s detectors t = 0.7 (a) and t = 0.9 (b). The
horizontal line in (a) and (b) shows the maximum bound of information for Eve when Alice prepares the initial amplitude as
the critical value µ = µ∗.
ancillary qubit sink into the Bob’s detector with the frac-
tion of 1− t. Unfortunately, there always exists θ which
satisfies θ + δ0sαa = θ
∗ + δ0s′α
′
a, where αa, α
′
a ∈ S(N)
and s, s′ ∈ {0, 1} it inevitably induces the collision be-
tween two mode. Thus Eve can not distinguish the initial
qubit state if it is in T-mode or A-mode unambiguously
and she could not avoid to intervening during A-mode
and her ancillary qubit sink into the Bob’s detector. The
ancillary qubit which does not carry the information Al-
ice’s screening angle and authentication angle makes the
Bob’s outcome O′b violating the integrity condition. Thus
Eve’s Trojan Horse attack should be noticed in the step
(A-mode 3).
CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed the non-deterministic two-way QKD
protocol and have demonstrated the security of the pro-
posed protocol against PNS, Impersonation and Torjan
Horse attack. Finally, we emphasize that the proposed
protocol has the following advantages compared with the
conventional QKD. 1) The quantum correlation is estab-
lished by exchanging the qubit with completely random
polarization. For that reason, our protocol can be imple-
mented with relatively dense coherent pulse. 2) Since the
mean photon number µ can be safely set is much higher
value than that of conventional QKD [13, 14] (see the last
paragraph of PNS analysis), the corresponding raw key
creation rate is higher than that of the conventional two-
way QKD. 3) The protocol provides the tunable security
depending on the number of screening angle N . Even
if an eavesdropper try to know the current status of the
protocol by a combination of photon number quantum
non-demolition measurement[10] and unambiguous state
discrimination [20], it can be avoided by increasing the
number of screening angle N .
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